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Chine : que vaut vraiment la marine de Xi Jinping ?

Jul 23, 2026  Twila Rosenbaum 13 views
Chine : que vaut vraiment la marine de Xi Jinping ?

In the past two decades, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undergone a transformation unprecedented in modern naval history. From a coastal defense force operating mostly Soviet-era vessels, it has evolved into a blue-water fleet capable of projecting power across the Indo-Pacific. Today, the PLAN numbers approximately 370 warships, surpassing the US Navy's 295 "grey hulls"—a milestone that reflects both China's industrial might and its leadership's strategic ambitions.

This growth is not merely quantitative. In the first half of 2025 alone, China launched five nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), a record pace that recalls the Soviet Union's peak production of six nuclear submarines per year. The United States, by contrast, currently produces only about 1.2 SSNs annually, a fact that has forced Washington to acknowledge delivery delays to Australia under the AUKUS pact. China's industrial capacity has become a decisive strategic asset, enabling Beijing to modernize faster than any other navy.

Industrial Power Meets Strategic Ambition

The rapid expansion of the PLAN is rooted in President Xi Jinping's vision of a "Chinese Dream" that includes maritime great-power status. Since 2016, the pace of shipbuilding has accelerated: whereas Admiral Christophe Prazuck, former French Chief of Naval Staff, estimated in 2016 that China was laying down the equivalent of the entire French fleet every four years, his successor Admiral Pierre Vandier noted in 2021 that this cycle had shortened to three years. The numbers are staggering: China now operates three aircraft carriers—the Liaoning, Shandong, and the newly commissioned Fujian—alongside a growing fleet of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious assault ships.

The Fujian, commissioned in November 2024, represents a quantum leap. Equipped with electromagnetic catapults (EMALS) similar to those on the US Gerald R. Ford-class carriers, it can launch a wider variety of aircraft, including fixed-wing early warning planes and electronic warfare platforms. This technology allows the PLAN to operate its carrier strike groups with greater efficiency and survivability, narrowing the gap with Western navies. A French officer noted that the Fujian "constitutes a technological rupture since it finally allows approaching American and French standards in aircraft launch capabilities."

Underwater Expansion: A New Dimension

China's submarine force has also seen dramatic growth. According to a 2024 Pentagon report, the PLAN is prioritizing the modernization of its submarine fleet, integrating new technologies such as land-attack cruise missiles and improving construction facilities. The five SSNs launched in six months are part of a broader effort to bolster three strategic pillars: nuclear deterrence (via ballistic missile submarines or SSBNs), offensive undersea warfare (via SSNs), and overall fleet size.

This underwater expansion serves a clear doctrine of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD). Analysts at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) in France argue that these submarines are designed to complicate or prevent US intervention in a potential conflict over Taiwan. By combining submarines, anti-ship missiles, and surface action groups, Beijing aims to impose prohibitive costs on any outside force attempting to cross the first island chain. The PLAN is no longer content to defend its coastal waters; it is building the capability to project power far beyond.

Operational Experience: The Missing Ingredient

Despite these impressive numbers, experts caution that the PLAN has not been tested in combat. Its last naval battle was the 1974 Paracel Islands engagement, a brief skirmish with South Vietnam. As a French officer explained, "China now has the largest navy in the world by number of ships, but it has not yet demonstrated the same level of operational mastery as the United States or France for complex, prolonged, and distant operations."

The PLAN has gained some experience through anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. These deployments, lasting months at a time, have taught Chinese sailors how to refuel at sea, coordinate logistics, and conduct operations far from home. In 2015, the PLAN evacuated nearly 600 Chinese and 200 foreign nationals from Yemen independently, and in 2017 it opened its first overseas base in Djibouti. Yet these are low-intensity missions compared to the demands of a major power conflict.

Recent exercises suggest growing ambition. In 2024, the PLAN conducted its first dual-carrier group operations, with the Liaoning and Shandong simulating the interception of an adversary carrier strike group. In July 2025, China and Russia held joint naval drills in the Pacific, followed by a patrol that included what Japan condemned as live-fire exercises in its exclusive economic zone. Still, the ability to sustain high-tempo operations under fire, with degraded communications and losses, remains unproven.

Technological and Human Gaps

Beyond experience, the PLAN faces structural challenges. An FRS report by former frigate commander Jérôme Henry highlights deficiencies in decentralized command and the competence of some commanding officers. The Chinese navy's rigid hierarchical culture, a legacy of its ground-force-dominated roots, may hinder the initiative needed in modern naval warfare. Moreover, logistics for extended overseas operations—repair, replenishment, and medical support—are still developing.

Nevertheless, the trajectory is clear. The PLAN is closing the gap in nearly every domain: carrier aviation, submarine warfare, electronic warfare, and integrated air defense. Its industrial capacity ensures that even if quality lags in some areas, quantity has a quality of its own. As Admiral Vandier noted, the pace of Chinese construction means that every three years, the PLAN adds a fleet roughly the size of the entire French Navy. For Western allies, this means the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific is shifting faster than anticipated.

The question is no longer whether China can build a world-class navy, but how it will use it—and whether its commanders can rise to the challenge when the moment of crisis comes.


Source:Lejdd News


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